"Philosophical communications are altogether different from scholarly publications. We have to make the distinction between these two perfectly clear, because we are all to inclined to measure philosophical communications against the standard of publications in the learned disciplines. In the course of the nineteenth century these disciplines began to operate like industries. The point was to get the product that had been manufactured out onto the market as quickly as possible, so that it could be of use to others, but also so that others could not pinch our discoveries or duplicate our own work. This has especially become the case in the natural sciences, where large-scale, expensive series of experiments have to be conducted. It is therefore altogether appropriate that we at long last have research facilities where we can gain a complete overview of dissertations and reports on experimental results that have already clarified this or that question in this or that direction."
"Today the major branches of industry and our military Chiefs of Staff have a great deal more 'savvy' concerning 'scientific' exigencies than do the 'universities'; they also have at their disposal the larger share of ways and means, the better resources, because they are indeed closer to what is 'actual.'"
"What we call Geisteswissenschaft [the so-called 'human' or 'historical' or 'cultural'sciences, such as economy, law, art, and religion] will not regress, however, into the status of what were formerly called the "fine arts." It will be transmogrified into a pedagogical tool for inculcating a 'political worldview.' Only the blind and hopelessly romantic among us can believe that the erstwhile structure and divisions and of scientific endeavor generally during the decade 1890-1900 can be preserved forever with all the congenial facades. Nor will the technical style of modern science, prefigured in its very beginnings, be altered if we choose new goals for such technology. That style will only be firmly embedded and absolutely validated by such new choices. Without the technology of the huge laboratories, without the technology of vast libraries and archives, and without the technology of a perfected machinery for publication, fruitful scientific work and the impact such work must have are alike inconceivable today. Every attempt to diminish or hamper this state of affairs is nothing short of reactionary."
"In contrast to 'science,' the state of affairs in philosophy is altogether different, When we say 'philosophy' here, we mean only the creative work of the great thinkers. In the very way it is communicated such work arrives in its own time, knows its own laws. The haste to 'get it out' and the anxiety of 'being too late' do not apply here, if only because it belongs to the essence of every genuine philosophy that its contemporaries invariably misunderstand it. It is also the case that the philosopher must cease to be a contemporary to himself. The more essential and revolutionary a philosophical doctrine is, the more it needs to educate those men and women, those generations, who are to adopt it. Thus, for example it still requires a great deal of effort for us to day to grasp Kant's philosophy in its essential import and to liberate it from the misinterpretations of its contemporaries and advocates."
(Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. 2: Eternal Recurrence of the Same)
"Closer to our own time, philosophy has encountered many new rivals. To start with, the human sciences and especially sociology wanted to replace it. But because philosophy, taking refuge in universals, increasingly misunderstood its vocation for creating concepts, it was no longer clear what was at stake. Was it a matter of giving up the creation of concepts in favor of a rigorous human science or, alternatively, of transforming the nature of concepts by turning them into collective representations or world views created by the vital, historical and spiritual forces of different peoples? Then it was the turn of epistemology, of linguistics, or even of psychoanalysis and logical analysis. In successive challenges, philosophy confronted increasingly insolent and calamitous rivals that Plato himself would have never imagined in his most comic moments. Finally the most shameful moment came when computer science, marketing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication, seized hold of the word concept itself and said, "This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! We are the friends of the concept, we put it in our computers." Information and creativity, concept and enterprise: there is already an abundant bibliography. Marketing has preserved the idea of a certain relationship between the concept and the event. But here the concept has become the set of product displays (historical, scientific, artistic, sexual, pragmatic) and the event has become the exhibition that sets up various displays and the "exchange of ideas" it is supposed to promote. The only events are exhibitions, and the only concepts are products that can be sold. Philosophy has not remained unaffected by the general movement that replaced critique with sales promotion. The simulacrum, the simulation of a packet of noodles, has become the concept; and the one who packages the product, commodity, or work of art has become the philosopher, conceptual persona, or artist. How could philosophy, an old person, compete against young executives in a race of the universals of communication for determining the marketable form of the concept, Merz? Certainly, it is painful to learn that the Concept indicates a society of information services and engineering. But the more philosophy comes up against shameless and inane rivals and encounters them at its very core, the more it feels driven to fulfill the task of creating concepts that are aerolites rather than commercial products. It gets the giggles, which wipe away its tears. So the question of philosophy is the singular point where concepts and creation are related to each other."
(Gilles Deleuze, What is Philosophy?)
(Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. 2: Eternal Recurrence of the Same)
"... the sciences do presuppose determinations such as becoming, space, time, sameness, and recurrence--in fact, must of necessity presuppose them as elements that remain eternally barred from their realm of inquiry and their manner of demonstration."
"True, the sciences must make use of a particular notion of force motion, space, and time; but they cannot ask what such things are as long as they remain sciences, and avoid trespassing into the realm of philosophy. The fact that every science as such, being the specific science it is, gains no access to its fundamental concepts and to what those concepts grasp, goes hand and hand with the fact that no science can assert something about itself with the help of its own scientific resources. What mathematics is can never be determined mathematically; what philology is can never be discussed philologically; what biology is can never be uttered biologically. To ask what a science is, is to ask a question that is no longer a scientific question. The moment he or she poses a question with regard to science in general, and that always means a question concerning specific possible sciences, the inquirer steps into a new realm, a realm with evidentiary claims and forms of proof quite different from those that are customary in the sciences. This is the realm of philosophy. It is not affixed to the sciences or piled on top of them. It lies hidden in the innermost domain of science, so much so that it would be true to say that mere science is only scientific -- that is to say, partaking of genuine knowledge, above and beyond being a repertory of certain techniques -- to the extent that it is philosophical. From this we can gather the alarming proportions of nonsense and absurdity in all ostensible efforts to renew the 'sciences' and abolish philosophy."
(Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. 2: Eternal Recurrence of the Same)
